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A Measure of the Investment Climate In South Africa 
 
TONGAI FOTO 
 
DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS 
 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE 
 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Abstract 
 
Investor confidence is a concept many investors are constantly trying to gauge. In practice 
however these concepts are usually not easy to measure. This study attempts to capture the 
total sum of investor perception in South Africa by examining market behaviour. Data from 
the JSE/FTSE (1995-2009) will be used to determine an Equity Risk Premium. Bond Yield 
Spreads will also be calculated from data provided by I-NET BRIDGE. An amalgamation of 
these components will produce the proposed Investment Confidence Index.  Similar indices 
currently on the South African Market are based on subjective surveys and might therefore be 
biased. The proposed index which is a first in SA will prove invaluable to practitioners in the 
financial sector. 
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1   Introduction 
 
This study seeks to determine an index that accurately measures investor confidence in the 
South African Market. 
 
Confidence in the economy and the capital markets is a critical driver of economic and 
financial fluctuations of the business cycle. Increased confidence means consumers and 
investors want to buy consumer goods, durables and invest at prevailing prices. When 
confidence decreases, spending and risk-taking tend to fall. 
 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange, JSE is the 14
th
 largest exchange in the world by market 
capitalization standing at 4.514 Trillion Rand (JSE Annual Report 2008). The South African 
Exchange is only marginally smaller than Stockholm and larger than no fewer than nine 
exchanges classified as “developed”. Last year saw 334 million shares being traded on the 
JSE. The JSE limited gives companies the opportunity to raise capital in the comfort of a 
highly regarded and sophisticated regulatory environment with no financial impediments to 
access by foreign investors. The Rand has a unified free-floating exchange rate backed by a 
liquid and deep sovereign bond market which has a turnover of 10 times the GDP. A choice 
of four markets is currently available on the JSE, the JSE Equities Market, the Yield X which 
is the JSE interest rate market, the JSE active financial derivatives market and the JSE 
agricultural products derivatives market. For the purposes of our study we will make use of 
variables from the JSE Equities Market which will be used to calculate our Equity Risk 
Premium. 
 
The JSE is the worlds largest single stock futures exchange by contracts traded and through 
its client centricity together with advanced technological ability, it provides its clients and 
approximately 1600 listed securities with first world services in an emerging market 
environment. 
 
The proposed index is a first in South Africa in that it employs a wholly quantitative 
technique to describe the investment climate. No persons opinion is sought in coming up with 
this index. The market is presumed to be the culmination of all market players‟ opinions and 
therefore represent the broadest opinion possible. The figures will provide the only tools for 
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analysis. A number of surveys have emerged in the past to gauge investor opinion, however 
these are usually handicapped by issues of timelines, reporting accuracy and the inevitable 
margins of error encountered when extrapolating broad opinion from a narrowly-delivered 
survey. 
 
For our proposed index the main components in compiling the index are the Equity Risk 
Premium (ERP) and Bond Yield Spreads.  
 
Risk appetite is a fundamental building block for any portfolio and the ERP is the single most 
fundamental motivation for investing in the stock market. In brief, the ERP is defined as the 
excess reward that investors require to accept the uncertain outcomes associated with owning 
equity securities. It is important in setting up portfolio returns expectations and determining 
asset allocation. It‟s under this backdrop that the ERP has been used as the main component 
in the proposed Index. Bond Yields have also been used because of the importance that 
Bonds have in any advanced market. Here in South Africa local asset allocation is primarily 
split between bond and equities with equities taking around 55% to 75% and the remainder 
being allocated to bonds and money market investments. 
 
To keep the study simple and relevant these are the only components which were used in 
coming up with the index. More components could have been added such as premiums from 
the property markets, commodity markets and currency markets etc but it would essentially 
have come to the same inference. 
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2    Literature Review 
 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the approach being used to come up with the proposed index 
has never been used here in South Africa. There are however some publications that might 
approximate to what we are trying to achieve. Perhaps the best known Investment Confidence 
Index is the State Street Investor Confidence Index, SSICI. This index provides an objective; 
quantitative measure of global risk tolerance of the world‟s sophisticated investors. Regional 
components measure separately the risk appetites of international investors in North America, 
Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
State Street‟s approach measures confidence directly and quantitatively by assessing the 
changes in investor holdings of risk assets and implementing a research model developed by 
Froot and O‟Conell (2003). The basic idea is that, the more of portfolios that sophisticated 
investors are willing to devote to riskier as opposed to safer investments, the greater the risk 
appetite or confidence. When risk appetite increases, investors move to increase, in the same 
proportion, their holdings of risky investment. This process may occur when there is good 
news and prices are up, but could also happen over a period of bad news and falling prices. 
As a result, the risk appetite of investors is a separate and distinct measure from the 
behaviour of prices. 
 
The index shows the risk appetite of these sophisticated investors by aggregating the common 
buying patterns of risk investments, and how their allocations evolve over time. 
The SSICI is similar to the proposed index in that it captures whether investors are bullish or 
bearish on risk for any given set of fundamentals whether positive or negative. 
 
Another Confidence Index Currently on the market is the Sanlam Investment Management 
(SIM) Confidence Index. The Institute of Behavioural finance conducts the research for the 
Index among 80 to 120 anonymous dependent and Independent Fund Managers and Financial 
Intermediaries. The index is based on the Yale School of Management Stock Market 
Confidence Index.  Fund Managers are asked the following four questions. 
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1. One-Year-Confidence Index: How much of a change in percentage terms do you 
expect in the JSE/FTSE ALLSI during the following periods: one month, next three 
months, next six months and the next year? 
2. Crash confidence Index: What do you think is the possibility of a catastrophic market 
crash (like 28 Oct 1928) occurring during the next six months? 
3. Buy-On-Dips: How would the JSE/FTSE ALLSI do the day after tomorrow if it were 
to drop by three percent tomorrow? 
4. Valuation-Confidence-Index: Stock prices in South Africa, when compared with 
measures of true fundamental value; are they too low, too high or just right? 
 
From these sets of questions an index is then drawn up to gauge the investment confidence in 
South Africa. Whilst SIMICI might serve its purpose it still comes short in avoiding biasness 
since it‟s highly opinionated. Who would have answered yes to a high probability on question 
2 just before the subprime crisis in America hit? Chances are no one. 
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 3   Equity Risk Premium  
 
 
The Equity risk premium (ERP) is defined as a reward that investors require to accept the 
uncertain outcomes associated with owning equity securities. Simply put, it is the extra return 
that equity holders expect to achieve over risk free returns. The equity premium is important 
in setting up portfolio return expectations and determining asset allocation policy. A higher 
premium implies that equities are more attractive that you would invest a greater share of 
your portfolio into equities if your risk appetite remained the same. 
 
Generally there are four ways in which to estimate the equity risk premium. These were 
summarised by Ibbotson and Chen (2002). The ERP‟s that are obtained are for the USA. 
 
1. Take a survey. An estimate of the ERP is obtained by surveying financial professionals or 
academics e.g. Welch (2000). The outcome of the ERP is usually from 4% to 7%. 
 
2. Historical method. Subtract risk-free bond returns from actual historical stock returns. e.g. 
Dimon, Marsh and Staunton (2002). The outcome of the ERP is from 3.5% (over 200 years) 
to 5%+ (more recently). 
 
3. Demand –side model. This uses a macroeconomic model to calculate the expected equity 
return by considering payoff demanded by investors, for bearing the risk of equity 
investments. e.g. Mehra and Prescott (1985) the outcome of the ERP is usually 0.5% to 2% 
 
4. Supply-side model. This uses fundamental information such as dividends, earnings or 
overall economic productivity.  e.g Arnott and Bernstein( 2002) the outcome of the ERP is 
from 0% to 2-3% 
 
 
The above methods all give surprisingly different results with surveys giving the biggest 
outcome. It‟s for this reason this paper uses a wholly quantitative approach. Surveys are 
highly subjective and seldom give accurate results. For this paper the supply side model will 
be employed to assess the equity risk premium.  
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Essentially what the Supply Side model does is to 
 
-estimate the expected total return on stocks 
-estimate the expected risk-free return (Treasury bond) 
-the difference of the two (expected total returns-risk free return) gives the required equity 
risk premium. 
 
The choice of the risk free rate is a very important component of the ERP. The risk free rate 
chosen has to be consistent with the risk free rate used to compute expected returns. If the 
treasury bill (TB) rate is used as the risk free rate, the premium has to be estimated relative to 
that rate. If a treasury bill is used as the risk free rate (rfr), the premium has to be the 
premium earned by stocks over that rate. A long-term default free government bond rate is 
the most commonly used risk-free rate applied in corporate valuations and finance. This 
paper uses a one month TB rate. This has been used because it is the shortest TB available 
and is therefore the least risky, it is also consistent with using one month returns of the equity 
market. 
 
3.1   Data 
 
The Equity data used has been taken from the JSE. In particular we will make use of the JSE-
FTSE ALL share index (ALSI), the dividend yield, one month TB rate and the „All items‟ 
Consumer Price Index. The data dates back from June 1995 to the present year, 2009. 1995 
has been used as the start year because that is when the equity market became more 
accessible and integrated with major developed equity markets. This came about as a result of 
reintegration of the South African financial system after financial sanctions were lifted 
following the first fully democratic elections in South Africa. 
 
Figure one below shows the movement of the All Share Index and the dividend yield over the 
past 14 years. 
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Figure 1: 
 
 
From Fig 1 the ALSI has been rising steadily over the years and reached an all time high of 
31841.27 on the 22
nd
  of  May 2008. The dividend yield has been fluctuating over the years 
and reached a high of 4.22% in April of 2003. South African consumer inflation rate has 
averaged 6.4% over the past 14 years. Below is a series of the  consumer inflation rate over 
the past 14 years. 
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Figure 2: 
 
3.2   Methodology and Results 
 
There are two leading supply-side model approaches which can be used. The dividends or 
earnings approach. In this paper the dividend approach is used. What it essentially says is that 
returns are a function of dividends and their future growth.( In other words, the dividend 
yield (%) +expected growth in dividends (%) =expected total return (%)). 
 
This approach is from the Gordon‟s Growth Model (Gordon 1959) which says that the fair 
price of a stock (P) is a function of the dividend per share (D), growth in the dividend (G) and 
the required rate of return (K). The Gordon‟s Growth Model has been used because of its 
simplicity and clarity, and it is useful in estimating expected rate of return. 
 
Below is an illustration of the equation of the Gordon‟s growth model 
 
                                                               1.1                             
 
Where    =Stock price (JSE ALLSI), =dividend dollars, =required return and =growth 
rate 
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If this equation is re arranged we get the following equation  
                                                                                        1.2                                                                             
 
Which is, dividend yield + dividend growth                                                                      
 
Fig 3 below shows a graph of the required return 
 
 
Figure 3: 
 
The dividend growth rate used in the above equation was a 10-year rolling average (to 
smooth out short term fluctuations and highlight longer term trends or cycles), which was 
calculated using the following equation: 
 
                                                                           1.3 
 
 
Where -dividend at present and - dividend 10 years ago  
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After the expected return had been found the next step was to estimate the expected risk-free 
rate. For this paper a one month TB rate was used. The graph below shows the movement of 
the TB rate over the past 14 years 
 
 
Figure 4: 
 
 
Finally what is left now is to calculate the equity risk premium itself which can be calculated 
using the following equation 
 
                                                                        1.4 
 
                        
 
Where  is the market implied required return and  is the one month TB rate used as a 
proxy for the risk free rate .The result is shown in figure five below 
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Figure 5: 
 
The above graph shows a period of negative risk premium from June 1998 to January 1999. 
To correct this, instead of using the real risk premium which deducts inflation we used the 
nominal rate to get a more representative and meaningful equity risk premium. The equation 
used was the following 
 
                                                          1.5                                                                    
 
Where  is the ERP and  is the all items CPI 
 
The graph below gives the nominal rate of the equity risk premium for the last 14 years. 
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Figure 6: 
 
 
3.2.1 Discussion of Results  
 
The acceptance of South Africa into the international financial community made it possible 
for important multilateral institutions to enter the domestic market. Institutions like the 
International Finance Corporation became actively involved in developing SA capital 
markets. In 1995 alone it approved its first investment amounting to $35.3 million. 
 
The SA equity market became integrated with international markets after the JSE was 
included into the Morgan Stanley Index on 1 March 1995. With this acceptance, equity 
capital in South Africa became cheaper and as a result, the ERP began a steady decline from 
a high of 19.5% in the third quarter of 1995. By the end of that year it had reached 13.5%. 
Other factors that could have contributed to the decline included new capital which was 
raised in the primary equity market which more than doubled from R10 billion in 1994 to 
R21.4 billion in 1995. The total number of 27 new listings in 1995 and 16 in the first 6 
months of 1996 reflected the interest in and strength of the share market as a source of 
finance. 
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Activity in the secondary equity market was extremely brisk and volatile in the first half of 
1996 with the ERP rising to 15.4% in February 1996, but decreasing to 11.1% by May of that 
year. Towards the end of 1996, the ERP was at 13.6%. Increased investor confidence was 
evident with the gradual decrease of the ERP in 1997 with figures reaching 10.9% by 
December 1997. The value of shares traded increased from R117 billion in 1996 to R201 
billion in 1997. The direction of the price-earnings ratio and dividend yield observed during 
the first five months of 1998 changed direction suddenly around June 1998 when non-
resident investor sentiment towards the SA share market became less positive. It was around 
this time that the ERP began to rise again having reached a record low of 0.7% in June 1998.  
 
In 1998, when Russia depreciated the rubble and restructured its external and domestic debt, 
capital flow began to be redirected to more advanced economies of the world, this aggravated 
the external financing difficulties of emerging market economies. The growth inhibiting 
problems of the developing economies such as overvalued exchange rates, low commodity 
prices, weak financial systems and balance of payments deficit, have been identified as 
reasons for loss of confidence in emerging markets. South Africa could not escape the spill 
over. This is evident in the rising ERP in 1998. Some of the reasons why the Asian contagion 
affected monetary and economic conditions in South Africa include among others, low 
domestic savings ratio, the inability to attract sustained inflows of foreign direct investment, 
high ratio of short-term external debt to international reserves and falling commodity prices. 
 
The principle elements that transmitted the crisis to SA were heavy selling of fixed 
international securities by non-resident Portfolio investors which caused an unavoidable rise 
of the lending rate by 725 basis points from June to August 1998. The ERP rose sharply on 
the background of uncertainties caused by the crisis. By the end of the year it stood at 8%. 
For 1999 the ERP continued to rise but at a slower pace than 1998, this was in part due to the 
R22.9 billion capital that was raised by the private sector as they turned to the primary share 
market as a source of finance. Total value of equity capital raised on the JSE stood at R88.4 
billion in 1998 which was more than the R50.3 billion raised in 1997. From September 1999 
buoyant domestic economic activity, easing of monetary policy and prospects of higher 
corporate earnings supported a strong upward movement in share prices. Likewise the ERP 
responded and declined from 10.3% in September 1999 to 6.9% by the end of that year.  
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In the beginning of 2000 the ERP began to rise again, investor confidence was adversely 
affected by a depreciating rand, downward price corrections on the international markets and 
higher interest rates. By the end of the year the ERP was at 15.8%. The total value of equity 
capital raised in the primary share market by listed companies fell from R74 billion in 2000 
to R24 billion in 2001. This was also evident in the 2001 ERP values which remained at high 
levels for the whole year. This was due in part to uncertain prospects for global economic 
growth and adverse conditions in the local share market. 
 
From 2002 the ERP started at 15% but took an abrupt turn upwards around may of that year. 
This was in part due to a culmination of events which dampened investor confidence. These 
events included the September 11 attacks in the US and the technology bubble burst in 2000, 
which saw the NASDAG stock index experiencing a 54% decline, from its peak in March 
2000 to its low in December 2000. Again low domestic and international share market returns 
and the geopolitical risks resulting in equity financing declining even further in the third 
quarter of 2002 saw the ERP reaching a high of 20.3% by December 2002. 
 
The year 2003 saw an impressive bull run on the JSE that went on until October 2007 when 
the ALSI reached 31334.99. The ERP also dropped sharply from beginning of 2003. This 
was on the backdrop of improved optimism about the global economy and the Iraq war 
ending. Funding in the primary equity market amounted to R10.2 billion in the first half of 
2003. Other positive news to come out of 2003 was the domestic and NYSE listing of state 
owned Telkom SA and its subsequent inclusion on the JSE-FTSE Top 40 at the end of its 
first week of trading. 
 
For 2004 the ERP continued to drop on the backdrop of a strong bull run on the JSE.  Equity 
financing gathered further momentum during 2004 reaching R33.9 billion in the first 7 
months of 2004. There was however a slight upward movement in the ERP from 4% to 5.5% 
in August 2004. This could have been as a result of weak global markets. However it quickly 
declined to 3% by October of the same year. During the first half of 2005 the domestic share 
price lost some of its previous momentum as global share markets began to react to high 
energy prices and their impact on global growth. This was also evident in the ERP movement 
which closed just above 4% at the end of 2004 but began to rise again reaching 7% by mid 
2005. By December 2005 it had reached 9%.  
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The year 2006 continued with the ERP remaining stable with minimal fluctuations. The 
buoyant commodity prices, an equity friendly policy environment with lower interest rates, 
positive sentiment towards the share market, the prospects of higher domestic growth and 
stronger international markets led domestic bourses to consecutive highs for 2005 and 2006. 
 
The upward trend in share prices which started beginning of 2003 through to the third quarter 
of 2007 ensured that trading activity in the secondary share market remained brisk well into 
2007. The total market capitalisation of the JSE at month ends increased by 41% from R4.1 
trillion in may 2006 to an all time high of R5.8 trillion in March 2007. The ERP remained 
stable for most of 2007 averaging 8.2%. 
 
Towards the end of 2007 the ERP suddenly began to rise on the backdrop of the subprime 
crisis that hit the US mortgage market and led to a loss of confidence in counterparties and a 
sharp decline in global share prices. In 2008 the ERP rose considerably. The high oil prices 
that characterised 2008 did not help the situation. In July 2008 the price of a single barrel 
reached a record high of $146. This obviously had a negative impact on the global economy 
including South Africa. Inflation figures increased markedly in both advanced and emerging 
markets including SA. Prices of energy and food reached high levels. The inflation figures for 
SA averaged 11.5% for 2008. 
 
Towards the end of 2008 ERP figures began to decline after having reached 20% in October. 
The worst seemed to be over as investors began to have a positive outlook in the world 
economies including South Africa. 
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4   Bond Yield Spreads 
 
4.1 Bonds 
 
In finance, a bond is a debt security, where the authorised issuer owes the holders a debt and, 
depending on the terms of the bond, is obliged to pay interest (coupon) and/or repay a 
principal at a later date, termed maturity. 
 
Simply put a bond is like a loan, the issuer being the borrower, the bond holder is the lender 
and the coupon is the interest. Bonds provide the borrower with external funds to finance 
long-term investments, or in the case of government bonds, to finance current expenditure. 
Global institutional investors continue to allocate assets primarily between equities and 
bonds. South Africa is no exception, equities take around 55% to 75% and the remainder 
being allocated to bonds and money market investment. South Africa has a heavy bias 
towards equities possibly because of a much younger population than more developed 
markets and an increase in defined contribution funds that revolves around life cycle 
investment options, Petzer (2006). It is against this backdrop that bond spreads have been 
incorporated into our proposed index. 
 
4.1.1 Bond Spreads 
 
 
A bond spread refers to the interest rate differential between two bonds. Bond spreads are the 
most popular way that market participants compare the value of one bond to another, much 
like price earnings ratios are used in equities.  Bond spreads reflect the relative risk of the 
bonds being compared, usually the higher the spread, the higher the risk.  The most common 
bond that is used to compare other bonds with is a government issued bond. This bond is 
considered a countries most creditworthy bond and will under normal circumstances never 
default. 
 
For our paper we will make use of the following spreads: Corporate spread, Term spread, 
Credit spread and Country spread. 
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4.2   Corporate and Credit Spreads  
 
 
A corporate spread (COS) is the difference between the yield to maturity of a coupon paying 
corporate bond and the yield to maturity on a coupon paying government bond. It measures 
the risk premium that compensates investors for holding risky corporate debt rather than 
default free debt. The COS reflects a number of risks associated with Corporate Bonds such 
as default risk, liquidity risk and tax risk among others. A COS curve will invert prior to and 
during an economic expansion and move upwards before an economic contraction. 
 
The bond market has always been an important source of funding for corporations. Corporate 
bond yields reflect credit market tightness, which in turn affects investment decisions and 
future economic growth. 
 
For this paper we will use a AAA rated bond which is Standard and Poor‟s highest rated 
bond. Such a bond has a credit risk that is almost zero. Some institutional investors such as 
fund managers are restricted by their mandates to holding bonds of a high level of credit 
rating. Since these ratings are standard across the world an AAA corporate bond in SA is the 
same as a AAA corporate bond in USA. The chances of any one of these bonds defaulting is 
highly unlikely. The government bond to be used is a 10 yr US Treasury Bond. 
 
Credit Spreads (CRS) on the other hand measure the yield differential of a BAA rated 
cooperate bond and a AAA corporate bond. Since the 1900s, credit spreads have displayed a 
fairly consistent pattern over the business cycle, rising sharply immediately before and during 
recessions and compressing as economic conditions recover, Diaz and Davis (2009). The fact 
that a AAA has almost a zero percent chance of default means that it is similar to a Treasury 
Bond in its movements and yield. This is easily confirmed when we plot a Credit spread and 
a Cooperate spread series on the same graph as below 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
  
 
Figure 7: 
 
The Credit Spread has wider spreads because of the higher risk associated with a AAA than a 
Treasury Bond.  From the graph we can easily see the rise in both spreads in the beginning of 
the second quarter of 2002. This could have been as a result of yields rising due to 
uncertainties in the economy as a result of the September 11 attacks. Another more 
pronounced rise in spreads can be seen in mid 2007 when the subprime crisis in the US hit 
causing spreads to widen.  
 
 
If we construct the ERP movement on the same axis as below, we notice a similar movement. 
When the ERP is down, the COS records a similar movement.   
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Figure 8:
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4.3 Term Spread 
 
These are spreads that reflect the different interest rates between bonds of different maturity. 
Long-term interest rates are usually higher than short term interest rates, therefore the term 
spread is usually positive. For most developed countries in the past 20 years a negative term 
spread tended to precede a recession approximately three quarters later, Guidolin and Rodean 
(2007). One reason for this might be that negative term spreads result from monetary policy 
tightening and a rise in short-term interest rates. These high short-term interest rates in turn 
produce an economic slowdown. In recent times this has not been the case in developed 
markets. Why the forecasting power of the yield curve has deteriorated remains a mystery. 
They are economists who have argued that this relationship may depend on the types of 
shocks affecting the economy, e.g. (supply shocks from oil prices vs. demand shocks from 
increased consumption) - Smets and Tsatsanoris (1997). The forecasting power of the term 
spread on economic growth is based on the fact that interest rates reflect the expectations of 
investors about the future economic situation when deciding about their plans for 
consumption and investment. Below is the movement of the term spread (difference between 
a 10 year SA government bond rate and a 91 day Treasury bill rate).  
 
 
Figure 9: 
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Points to note from the above graph are the negative term spreads. These correspond to a 
contraction in the economy. The second half of 1998 saw a negative term spread when the 
short-term interest rates recorded higher percentages than the long-term interest rates. This 
period corresponds to the Russian crisis which spread to emerging markets including South 
Africa.  With the introduction of a new monetary policy in SA that was based on inflation 
targeting, the short-term interest rate has closely followed the movement of the inflation rate. 
From the second quarter of 2002 to the end of the first half of 2003 the term spread was again 
negative. This period corresponds with higher inflation figures which in turn caused interest 
rates to rise as well resulting in a slow down in economic growth.  The third period of 
negative spreads was from the fouth quarter of 2006 to the beginning of the fourth quarter of 
2008. This period witnessed high inflation triggered by high oil prices and subsequently food 
prices also rose. The short-term interest rates likewise reacted and rose significantly resulting 
in higher short term interest rates than long term interest rates. As a result of this, the 
economic growth rate slowed down.  Below is a graph of the movement of the CPI and the 
short-term interest rates over the years. 
 
 
Figure 10: 
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4.4  Country Spread 
 
This spread incorporates a sovereign spread (SS) and a currency spread (CS).The sovereign 
spread represents the difference between bond yields issued on international markets by the 
country in question versus those offered by the US government. In this case the country is 
South Africa and the government is USA. Emerging economies have used external bond 
financing in the last few decades, South American countries alone account for over 60% of 
outstanding bonds in the Emerging Market Bond Index(EMBI) constructed by J P Morgan. 
Calvo, Leidermann and Reinhart (2003). 
 
A SS is supposed to compensate investors for sovereign default risk. Emerging market 
spreads are influenced by global factors, risk appetite, industrial country interest rates and 
liberalisation of investment rules. 
 
4.4.1   The driver of Sovereign Spreads in emerging markets 
 
From a theoretical perspective, a rise in US policy interest rates could lead to an increase in 
emerging market spreads for several reasons. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) 
 
Since emerging market bonds are risky (there is a probability of default), the yield on 
emerging market bonds has to rise by more than any rise in the risk free rate. As an 
illustration 
 
If  and represent the interest rate on the risk free asset and the risky asset respectively, and 
P is the probability of repayment on the risky asset, then there is no arbitrage if  
                                                     
               (1+a) =P*(1+i) + (1-P)*0   1.6 
 
The interest rate spread S, defined as the difference between the rate on the risky asset and on 
the risk free asset, in equilibrium is then 
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                                                                                1.7 
                    
                  which is positive as long as P<1                1.8  
 
So what the above is saying, is that as long as there is some risk of default, the rate on the 
risky asset will have to rise by more than any rise in the risk free rate in order to compensate 
investors for the risk. 
 
A rise in the US interest rates could also raise emerging market spreads through its effects on 
the ability of debtor countries to repay loans. A rise in US rates would tend to increase debt 
service burdens in borrowing countries, which would reduce their ability to repay loans. As 
noted by Kamin and Kleist (1999), a rise in US rates could reduce investor‟s appetite for risk. 
This would then lead them to reduce their exposure in risky markets, in turn reducing 
available financial resources in borrowing countries. 
 
Another driver of the sovereign spreads is the US monetary policy, Arora and Cerisola 
(2001). In 1994 when US monetary policy was tightened there was a substantial widening of 
SS and after the 1998 Russian crisis there was an easing of US monetary policy in response 
to the flight to quality and the concerns about a US credit crunch associated with the Russian 
default helped to restore global liquidity conditions and to reduce SS. 
 
Other studies noted that falling US interest rates are generally associated with an abundance 
of capital in international markets which bring down yields hence spreads, Cline and Barnes 
(1997).  Higher credit ratings have been known to translate to lower country spreads, 
Eichengren and Mody (1998) 
 
Another driver of Country Spreads is the global investor‟s attitude towards risk which is 
referred to as global risk aversion. Risk issues are becoming increasingly relevant owing to 
the sophistication of financial markets, and the impact on emerging markets of international 
investor‟s appetite for risk is clearly recognised today, see Broner, Gelos and Reinhart 
(2004). 
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Country spreads, world interest rates and business conditions are all interrelated. Country 
spreads affect aggregate activity but also respond to domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Uribe and Yue (2004). Below is a graph of the movement of the country spread (SA) from 
1995 to the first quarter of 2009. A 10 year US Treasury bond yield is used as a proxy for the 
risk free rate and a 91 day treasury bill is used as the short term interest rate. 
 
 
Figure 11: 
 
From the graph a sharp rise is evident towards the end of the first quarter of 1998, it is around 
this time that the Russian crisis emerged raising US interest rates hence bond yields which in 
turn raised the CS. It was only after the US eased monetary policy did interest rates start 
falling resulting in the CS dropping around the fourth quarter of 1998. The relationship 
between CS and US interest rates was also evident after the September 11 attacks of 2001. 
Because of the uncertainties resulting from this attack, US markets reacted by raising interest 
rates which is typical in situations when the economy is depressed or it‟s percieved to be 
depressed. Around October of 2001 the CS rose from 4.5% to 8.48% by September 2002.  
The sub-prime crisis in the US in 2006-2007 also triggered a rise in interest rates which also 
had a profound effect on the CS as evident from the graph. It peaked to 7.68% in June 2008 
before beginning to decline. 
These three examples clearly show a strong relationship between Country Spreads and US 
interest rates. 
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5   Investment Climate Index (ICI) 
 
 
From the previous two chapters, we managed to capture the risk and reward associated with 
equities in calculating the ERP. Bond Yield Spreads were also calculated. What remains now 
is to calculate the actual index itself. On adding the various spreads to the ERP we get a 
series that incorporates the ERP and Bond Spreads in a way that essentially measures 
investment confidence.  
 
Figure 12 
Figure 12 above is an illustration of the movement of the components which make up the ICI. 
Before we transform the above series into a true index, we shall introduce a very important 
technique which will help in understanding and describing the proposed index.  
 
5.1 Purchasing Power Parity 
 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is an economic technique used when attempting to determine 
the relative values of two currencies.  It is useful because often the amount of goods a 
currency can purchase within 2 nations varies drastically, based on availability of the goods, 
demand for the goods, and other factors which are sometimes difficult to determine. 
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What the PPP does to solve the above problem, is to take some international measure and 
determine the cost for that measure in each of the two currencies, and then compare the 
amounts. Gustav Cassel (1920) developed the PPP concept. In theory it states that in ideally 
efficient markets, identical goods should have only one price. Below is an illustration of the 
PPP 
                                           
Were  represents the exchange rate of currency 1 to currency 2,   is the cost of good x in 
currency 1 and  is the cost of  good x in currency 2. 
The exchange rates between currencies are in equilibrium when their purchasing power is the 
same in each of the two countries. When a domestic price level is increasing (a country 
experiences inflation), that country‟s exchange rate must depreciate in order to return to PPP.  
Exchange rates in the short term are news driven. Announcements about interest rates 
changes, changes in perception of the growth patterns of economies etc are all factors that 
drive exchange rates in the short run. PPP, by comparison, describe the long run behaviour of 
exchange rates. The economic forces behind PPP will eventually equalise the Purchasing 
Power of currencies, this however takes a long time. A time horizon of 4-10 years is typical. 
Figure 13 shows the Premium/Discount of the PPP for South Africa and the USA. The series 
illustrates the movement of the premium from 1995 to the first quarter of 2009.  While the 
PPP does not measure Investor sentiment it is strongly related to foreign exchange rates 
which in turn are related to investor sentiment. Movements of investor sentiment also mirror 
movements in the premium/discount of the PPP to a certain extent.  
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Figure 13 
A high premium for the PPP indicates that the Rand is undervalued when compared to the 
dollar. In other words the same product theoretically costs less in SA than in the USA. The 
Rand therefore needs to appreciate against the dollar. From figure 13 it shows that the rand 
has been undervalued for most of the time. A premium that is close to 0% indicates that the 
price of goods in SA and USA cost almost the same when exchange rates are taken into 
consideration. From the 3
rd
 quarter of 2003 to the beginning of the 3
rd
 quarter of 2008 the 
PPP premium averaged just 14%. This period also coincides with the period when the 
investment confidence in SA was very high as illustrated in figure 16.  
 
The correlation of the series in figure 12 (Erp + Bond Yield Spreads) and the series in figure 
13 of the PPP gives an interesting insight into the relationship between Investor sentiment 
and PPP. From the period 1995-2008 the correlation was 0.39. While this is not a high 
correlation it confirms that there is a relationship between these two concepts. If we take the 
correlation from 2002-2008 we get a fairly strong positive correlation of 0.67.  
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Figure 14 
 
Investment Confidence Index 
 
It is important to note that that the graph has a similar movement to the graph of the ERP. 
This is because the ERP is the biggest component in our proposed index and the various risk 
premia would be related. To convert the above series to an index in the strictest of sense we 
transformed the series using a Fisher transformation. This is a simple mathematical procedure 
that converts any data to a modified data set whose probability density function is 
approximately normal. With the transformation it confines the series to between -1 and +1 
making it more convenient to interpret as an index. The equation below is for the Fisher 
inverse transform 
 
 
                                                                    1.9 
 
 
Where x is the input (Erp+ Bond Yield Spreads) and y is the resulting index. This translation 
puts limits to our index for extreme conditions. An index number of zero would be the lower 
limit indicating no confidence or a risk premium so high that investment is impossible. An 
index number of 100 would be the upper limit indicating a perfect investment climate with 
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zero risk and abundant capital.  The index is therefore bounded and would never reach these 
two extreme conditions. 
 
Fig 13 below is a series of the proposed Investment Confidence Index for South Africa. 
 
 
 
Figure 15: 
 
 
Significant points to note on the graph 
 
 
1. August 1998 saw the most dramatic fall in investor confidence, which was perhaps only 
equalled by the October 2007 drop. The Asian crisis of 1998 left many emerging markets 
reeling from the effects and South Africa was not spared either. Investor confidence fell from 
a high of 87.83 at the beginning of August 1998 to 79.09 by December of the same year. 
 
2. January 2000 saw a drop in the investment confidence index (ICI) from 84.55 to 74.65 by 
October of that year. A weaker rand, downward price corrections on the international markets 
together with higher interest rates were some of the reasons for the downward movement. 
 
3. December 2002 saw the index reach its lowest point since august 1995.  A culmination of 
the September 11 attacks of 2001 as well as geopolitical risks resulted in equity financing 
declining resulting in the low investor confidence in last quarter of 2002. 
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4. The subprime crisis of 2007 that hit the United States affected investors confidence in 
South Africa with the index dropping from 86.9 points in October 2007 to 69.73 exactly a 
year later. The crisis resulted in a loss of confidence in counterparties and a sharp decline in 
global share prices. High oil prices were also in 2008 also dampened investor confidence 
with the oil prices reaching $146/barrel in July 2008. 
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6 Conclusion 
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In this study we set out to create a metric that would accurately describe the investment 
climate in South Africa. 
 
An investment climate index (ICI) was compiled by calculating the equity risk premium of 
SA and amalgamating it with Bond yield Spreads. The resulting series was then transformed 
using a fisher inverse transform. This is a simple mathematical procedure that converts any 
data to a modified data set whose probability density function is approximately normal. With 
the transformation it confines the index to between 0 and 100 making it more convenient to 
interpret as an index.   
 
Every investment decision is composed of three elements. The asset return, the risk 
associated with the asset and the risk appetite of the investor. Whilst the proposed ICI might 
not fully capture the risk appetite of the investor it can give some indication of the investment 
mood or climate in the market. 
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A high index figure would usually correspond to a confidence in the market for the investor, 
it might also mean investors are just not taking risk and are not necessarily confident about 
the market.  
What makes this ICI for SA unique is that it is wholly quantitative and the market is 
presumed to be the culmination of all market participants‟ opinions and therefore represent 
the broadest opinion possible. No one‟s opinion was sort in coming up with the index. 
 
The proposed ICI will be of great importance to policy implementation. It will offer some 
early notice of what the immediate investment climate might look like. This can prove useful 
for adjustments in target setting for collective investments and other investment products. 
The ICI can also be used in demonstrating trends and comparing the investment climate over 
different periods and market events. 
 
Our ICI gives unique insight into investor confidence and is not intended to predict market 
events. It is simply a timely and quantitative tool indicating what the investor perception is at 
the present moment. It is a tool that will help investors make better informed investment 
decisions. 
The ICI will enable horizontal comparison of investment conditions and climate as well as 
indicate trends and cycles in the investment climate of South Africa. 
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Appendix 
 
DATE ALLSI(P) DIVY(D/P) (D) g= k (rfr) CPI erp 
nominal 
erp 
6/30/1995 4883.44 2.50 122.02 20.8% 23.9% 14.1% 10.0% 8.6%   
7/31/1995 4922.01 2.46 121.02 20.0% 23.0% 13.9% 9.0% 8.0%   
8/31/1995 5011.39 2.51 125.65 20.7% 23.7% 13.9% 7.5% 8.6% 19.5% 
9/30/1995 5131.82 2.44 125.43 20.0% 23.0% 14.0% 6.4% 7.9% 17.6% 
10/31/1995 5238.14 2.36 123.40 20.0% 22.8% 13.7% 6.3% 8.1% 16.2% 
11/30/1995 5377.13 2.38 127.85 20.0% 22.9% 13.7% 6.4% 8.1% 15.0% 
12/31/1995 5598.73 2.26 126.43 19.2% 21.9% 14.2% 6.9% 6.7% 13.5% 
1/31/1996 6187.72 2.01 124.27 19.2% 21.6% 13.9% 6.9% 6.7% 13.6% 
2/29/1996 6012.91 2.12 127.67 20.5% 23.0% 14.0% 6.5% 7.9% 15.4% 
3/31/1996 6071.50 2.15 130.64 19.9% 22.5% 14.1% 6.3% 7.4% 14.8% 
4/30/1996 6338.50 2.04 129.40 19.7% 22.1% 15.1% 5.5% 6.1% 13.0% 
5/31/1996 6213.43 2.14 132.86 18.7% 21.3% 16.1% 5.9% 4.5% 11.1% 
6/30/1996 6212.22 2.15 133.36 20.1% 22.7% 15.1% 6.9% 6.6% 12.4% 
7/31/1996 5975.95 2.30 137.39 18.5% 21.2% 15.1% 7.1% 5.3% 11.5% 
8/31/1996 6083.70 2.33 141.68 18.2% 21.0% 15.8% 7.5% 4.5% 11.7% 
 
        = 6187.2*2.01/100=124.27 
 =  
        
           =  
            = 21.6% 
  
   
  
=  
 
 
 
 
 
 
